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Planning on the 4-disk version of the Tower of London (TOL4) was examined in stroke
patients and unimpaired controls. Overall TOL4 solution scores indicated impaired plan-
ning in the frontal stroke but not non-frontal stroke patients. Consistent with the claim
that processing the relations between current states, intermediate states, and goal states
is a key process in planning, the domain-general relational complexity metric was a good
indicator of the experienced difficulty of TOL4 problems. The relational complexity metric
shared variance with task-specific metrics of moves to solution and search depth. Frontal
stroke patients showed impaired planning compared to controls on problems at all three
complexity levels, but at only two of the three levels of moves to solution, search depth
and goal ambiguity. Non-frontal stroke patients showed impaired planning only on the most
difficult quaternary-relational and high search depth problems. An independent measure
of relational processing (viz., Latin square task) predicted TOL4 solution scores after con-
trolling for stroke status and location, and executive processing (Trail Making Test). The
findings suggest that planning involves a domain-general capacity for relational processing
that depends on the frontal brain regions.
Keywords: Tower of London, planning, moves to solution, search depth, goal ambiguity, relational complexity,
stroke, frontal lobes
INTRODUCTION
Planning is important in many areas of life and impairments in this
capacity have adverse implications for independent living (Jeffer-
son et al., 2006). Planning involves cognitive processes that depend
on frontal regions of the brain (Shum et al., 2000, 2009; Unter-
rainer and Owen, 2006). In the current research, we examined
the extent to which planning assessed using a 4-disk version of
the Tower of London (TOL) is impaired in people who have suf-
fered a stroke. A further issue relates to the nature of the cognitive
processes that planning involves. More specifically, the research
investigated the claim that processing the relations between cur-
rent states, intermediate states, and goal states is a key process in
planning (Halford et al., 1998) and that the complexity of these
relations is a good indicator of the experienced difficulty of the
TOL problems.
Planning in tower tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi and the
TOL involves devising a sequence of moves in order to transform
an initial state into a specified goal state. In the original 3-disk ver-
sion of the TOL (viz., TOL3) developed by Shallice (1982), three
colored disks are presented on three poles that differ in height.
Respondents are required to rearrange the disks to match a target
configuration (goal state) and to do so in a specified number of
moves.
The results of several studies that employed the TOL3 to assess
planning following traumatic brain injury (e.g., Cockburn, 1995;
Rasmussen et al., 2006), suggested the need to increase the sensi-
tivity of the TOL3 by including more difficult items. To address
this issue, Tunstall (1999) developed the 4-disk version (TOL4)
that includes ten items that require as many as nine moves. Shum
et al. (2009) used the TOL4 to examine impairments in planning
following traumatic brain injury. The patients performed more
poorly than matched controls, but the impairment was specific
to patients with frontal damage and to the items that required a
greater number (i.e., six to nine) of moves. No planning impair-
ment was observed on items that required fewer (i.e., two to five)
moves. Planning performance in patients with no frontal dam-
age was comparable to matched controls. The findings of Shum
et al. (2009) demonstrated the importance of employing sensitive
measures of planning. In that study, sensitivity was achieved by
including simpler as well as more difficult problems that required
fewer moves or more moves, respectively.
Moves to solution is widely used as a metric of TOL problem
difficulty that has been employed in brain imaging studies and
computational approaches to planning and problem solving in the
TOL (e.g., Dehaene and Changeux, 1997; Newman et al., 2003).
However, the number of moves to solution has been criticized as
a complexity metric on the grounds that it does not sufficiently
capture the cognitive processes underlying performance. Such crit-
icisms have prompted researchers to consider alternate complexity
metrics that tap different structural parameters of the tower tasks
(Ward and Allport, 1997; Kaller et al., 2011, 2012; Köstering et al.,
2014).
Köstering et al. (2014) examined two such factors (search depth
and goal hierarchy) in the 3-disk TOL. Search depth refers to the
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number of intermediate moves that must be considered before
the first goal move is made. When search depth is higher a longer
series of intermediate moves and their interdependencies must be
considered. Goal hierarchy (goal ambiguity) refers to the extent to
which the correct sequential ordering of the goal moves is obvi-
ous from the specified goal state. When the goal state is vertical
(i.e., all disks on the same pole), it is clear that the disk in the
lowest position on the pole has to be placed before the disks in
higher positions, so the sequential ordering of the moves is rel-
atively unambiguous. When the goal state is flat (i.e., a disk on
each of three poles), the sequential ordering of the moves is more
ambiguous. Köstering et al. (2014) examined the effects of these
two factors in a sample of normally aging adults. Adults aged
from 60 to 76 years performed comparably on problems with low
search depth, but performance declined significantly from 60 to
76 years on problems with high search depth. Adults over 76 years
performed poorly irrespective of search depth. The effect of goal
ambiguity was significant in that problems with less ambiguous
goals were performed better than those with goals that were more
ambiguous. However, this effect did not vary with age. The find-
ings were interpreted as consistent with the frontal lobe theory of
cognitive aging. Greater search depth imposes a higher demand on
working memory, which is subserved by frontal regions, whereas
increased goal ambiguity is thought to involve the striatum.
The search depth metric used by Köstering et al. (2014) to esti-
mate the complexity of items on the 3-disk TOL is similar in some
respects to the metric proposed in relational complexity theory
(Halford et al., 1998). In this theory, complexity is defined in a
domain-general way. It corresponds to the number of variables
that are related in a cognitive representation, or the number of
slots that must be filled. The simplest (unary) relations have a sin-
gle slot. An example is class membership. The fact that Fido is a dog
can be expressed as dog (Fido). Binary relations have two slots. An
example is larger-than(elephant, mouse). Ternary relations have
three slots as in arithmetic addition(2,3,5). Quaternary relations
have four slots, as in proportion(2,3,6,9). More complex relations
are predicted to impose higher processing loads than less com-
plex relations. Thus, ternary relations impose a higher load than
binary relations, and quaternary relations impose a higher load
than ternary relations. On average, young adults can process four
interacting variables in the same decision (Halford et al., 2005)
consistent with a quaternary-relational limit.
The Method for Analysis of Relational Complexity (MARC)
incorporates a set of principles for estimating the complexity
of cognitive tasks (in terms of the metric) and the processing
loads they impose (Halford et al., 2007b, 2010; Andrews and
Halford, 2011). The estimates must be based on sound knowl-
edge of how people perform the task and opportunities to reduce
complexity and processing load through the use of segmentation
and chunking must be taken into account. Segmentation involves
decomposing (segmenting) complex tasks into less complex com-
ponents that do not overload capacity and that can be processed
in succession. Conceptual chunking involves recoding concepts
into fewer variables. For example, the ternary-relational concept
velocity, defined as velocity= distance/time, can be recoded into a
unary-relational concept as when speed is indicated by the posi-
tion of a pointer on a dial. However, the reduction in processing
load occasioned by conceptual chunking comes at the cost of tem-
porary loss of access to the relationships that make up the concept.
For example, a unary-relational representation of velocity would
not be sufficient to determine how velocity changes as a function
of time or of distance, but it would be adequate if current veloc-
ity is the only variable of interest. By the principle of cognitive
economy, humans will employ the least complex representation
available to complete the task. More complex representations
will be constructed only when less complex representations prove
inadequate.
When tasks have multiple steps, task complexity corresponds to
the most complex step. The processing load imposed will depend
on the number of interacting variables that must be represented
in parallel to perform the most complex step of the task, using the
least demanding strategy available. Thus, demand corresponds to
the peak load imposed during performance of the task, rather than
to the total amount of processing involved. Complexity and num-
ber of steps can be manipulated independently as shown by Birney
et al. (2006).
The relational complexity metric has been applied to tasks
in many different content domains including transitive infer-
ence (Halford, 1984; Andrews and Halford, 1998; Andrews, 2010;
Andrews and Mihelic, 2014), suppositional reasoning (Birney and
Halford, 2002), categorical syllogisms (Zielinski et al., 2010), con-
ditional reasoning (Cocchi et al., 2014), class inclusion (Halford
and Leitch, 1989), inferences based on classification hierarchies
(Halford et al., 2002b), card sorting (Halford et al., 2007a), bal-
ance scale reasoning (Halford et al., 2002a; Andrews et al., 2009),
numerical reasoning (English and Halford, 1995; Andrews and
Halford, 2002; Knox et al., 2010), and theory of mind (Andrews
et al., 2003; Halford and Andrews, 2014), as well as decision mak-
ing in gambling tasks (Bunch et al., 2007; Andrews et al., 2008),
delay of gratification (Bunch and Andrews, 2012), reversal learn-
ing and conditional discrimination (Andrews et al., 2012), and
comprehension of relative clause sentence (Andrews et al., 2006).
The breadth with which the relational complexity metric has been
(can be) applied contrasts with other metrics that apply to specific
content domains or tasks with a specific structure.
Studies such as those cited above show that the complexity of
relations that humans can process increases with age during child-
hood (Andrews and Halford, 2002, 2011; Bunch and Andrews,
2012), reaching quaternary relations in adulthood (Halford et al.,
2005) before declining in later adulthood (Viskontas et al., 2005;
Andrews and Todd, 2008).
In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that the diffi-
culty of TOL4 problems stems from their complexity. A relational
complexity analysis of the 10 TOL4 items was conducted. The
complexity analysis of three of the problems will be illustrated.
The initial configuration of disks on poles was the same for all
problems and it is shown in Figure 1A. The yellow (Y) and white
(W) disks were on the leftmost pole (1), the blue (Bu) and black
(Bk) disks were on the rightmost pole (3), while the middle pole
(2) was unoccupied.
A move is coded as the binary relation, shift(color, pole). In
the first problem, the goal is to transform the initial configuration
(Figure 1A) into the target configuration (Figure 1B) in which
yellow and white are on pole 1 and black and blue disks are on
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FIGURE 1 | Four-diskTower of London (TOL4) test. (A) Initial
configuration used in all problems; (B) target configuration for the
binary-relational problem described in the text; (C) target configuration for
the ternary-relational problem described in the text; (D) target configuration
for the quaternary-relational problem described in the text.
pole 2. This requires two moves. First, blue must be moved to pole
2. This is expressed as shift(Bu, 2). Second, black must be moved
to pole 2. This can be expressed as shift(Bk, 2). Each move can be
performed without taking any other move into account so com-
plexity depends solely on two slots, the disk to be moved and the
location to which it is moved. Therefore both moves are binary-
relational, so the maximum complexity during this problem is
binary-relational.
In a more complex problem, the goal is to transform the
initial configuration (Figure 1A) into the target configuration
(Figure 1C) in which all four disks are on pole 3 in the top-down
order yellow, white, blue, and black. This problem involves nested
moves. Before white can be moved to pole 3, yellow must be moved
to pole 2. Nested moves such as this are coded as the higher-order
relation:
prior(shift(color, pole), shift(color, pole)).
For the problem described, this sequence can be expressed as:
prior(shift(W, 3), shift(Y, 2)).
Here, there are four slots to be filled, so prima facie a relation
between four variables is being represented. However, conceptual
chunking can be employed to reduce the task to ternary-relational.
In the preceding example, Y, 2 can be chunked as a single entity
corresponding to “obstructing disk” (Y2) that has to be removed
to enable shift(W, 3). Thus the operative variables are: disk to be
shifted (W), the goal for that disk (3), and the goal for the obstruct-
ing disk (2). The principle is that the color of the obstructing disk
(Y) does not need to be processed independently of the need to
find a pole to shift it to, so as to remove the obstruction of shifting
white to pole 3. Planning these nested moves involves ternary-
relational processing. The final move involves shifting the yellow
disk to pole 3, shift(Y, 3), which is binary-relational, as in the previ-
ous example. Thus the maximum complexity during this problem
is ternary-relational.
In an even more complex problem, the goal is to transform
the initial configuration (Figure 1A) into the target configuration
(Figure 1D) in which yellow is on pole 1, black is above white
on pole 2, and blue is on pole 3. This problem involves multiple
nestings and conceptual chunking. Before yellow can be placed at
the base of pole 1, yellow must first be moved to pole 3 so that
white can be moved to pole 2. Such situations can be expressed as
the higher-order relation,
prior(shift(colour, pole), prior(shift(colour, pole)),
shift(colour, pole)).
These expressions can be read most easily starting at the rightmost
move. Thus, in the example immediately below, Y, 3 is moved first,
followed by W, 2, followed by Y, 1. For the problem described
(Figure 1D), this move can be expressed as:
prior(shift(Y, 1), prior(shift(W, 2), shift(Y, 3))).
This can be chunked to quaternary-relational representation as;
prior(shift(Y, 1), prior(shift(W/Y, 2/3)))
The chunked portion can then be unpacked as;
prior(shift(W, 2), shift(Y, 3))
This yields the move to shift Y to 3 before shifting W to 2, then Y
can be shifted to 1. The goal of the next move is to have blue on
pole 3 and black on pole 2. To achieve this goal, blue must be first
be moved to pole 1 so that black can be moved to pole 2 before
blue is moved back to pole 3. This move can be expressed as,
prior(shift(Bu, 3), prior(shift(Bk, 2), shift(Bu, 1))).
As with the previous problem, chunks Bu/Bk and 2/1 can be
formed, reducing the move to quaternary-relational complexity.
The chunked representation can be unpacked yielding Bk on 2
and Bu on 1. Finally, Bu can be moved to 3. As in the ternary-
relational problem described above, some chunking is possible.
However, planning the sequence of moves will be more demand-
ing in problems with multiple nestings because each nesting adds a
new variable. By applying chunking according to the MARC prin-
ciples the task can be performed with representations no more
complex than quaternary-relational.
Our complexity analysis showed that the 10-item TOL4 (Shum
et al., 2000, 2009) consists of two binary-relational, five ternary-
relational, and three quaternary-relational problems. To ensure
there were sufficient items at each complexity level, five additional
items were generated, resulting in a 15-item test with three, six, and
six problems at the binary-, ternary-, and quaternary-relational
levels of complexity, for use in the current study.
We predicted that problems with lower estimated complex-
ity would be easier than those with higher estimated complexity.
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Based on previous research demonstrating a quaternary-relational
limit in young to middle adulthood (Halford et al., 2005) and
age-related declines in relational processing in later adulthood
(Viskontas et al., 2005; Andrews and Todd, 2008), we expected that
quaternary-relational problems would be very difficult for our par-
ticipants whose mean age was 66.3 years. Problem difficulty was
also examined in relation to three metrics that are specific to tower
tasks; namely moves to solution, goal ambiguity, and search depth.
We predicted that frontal lobe lesions would particularly impair
TOL4 performance. This prediction is based on two lines of evi-
dence. First, planning as assessed by the TOL3 has been shown to
depend on the frontal regions (Newman et al., 2003; Unterrainer
and Owen, 2006; Köstering et al., 2014). Second, evidence from
lesion (Waltz et al., 1999, 2004; Andrews et al., 2013) and imaging
studies (Kroger et al., 2002; Crone et al., 2009) has demonstrated
an important role for the frontal lobes in relational processing.
Therefore, if participants who have suffered a stroke affecting the
frontal brain regions should show greater impairment on the TOL4
problems than those who have suffered a stroke affecting non-
frontal regions or those who have not suffered a stroke, this would
be consistent with the relational processing interpretation. Group
differences will be examined on TOL4 problems at each level of
relational complexity and at each level of moves to solution, goal
ambiguity, and search depth.
A further prediction based on relational complexity theory was
that an independent measure of relational processing [viz., Latin
square task (LST)] would predict TOL4 solution scores after con-
trolling for stroke status and location. This prediction was based
on research demonstrating the domain-general nature of capac-
ity to process complex relations (Halford et al., 2002a,b; Andrews
et al., 2006, 2013; Birney et al., 2006, 2012; Bunch and Andrews,
2012). The predictive ability of the LST which includes items at
binary, ternary, and quaternary levels of complexity was compared
to the Trail Making Test (TMT), which is widely used to assess
executive processes and frontal functioning. TMT was expected to
account for variance in TOL4 due to the tasks’ common reliance on
frontal regions (Müller et al., 2014). If the LST accounts for vari-
ance in TOL4 performance over and above the TMT this would
further support the view that TOL4 involves complex relational
processing.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The sample consisted of 83 individuals who were all native speakers
of English and who were living independently in the commu-
nity. Forty-three participants had brain lesions due to stroke and
40 had no known brain injury. The unimpaired individuals were
recruited through sporting and social clubs. The stroke sufferers
were recruited through stroke support groups in the Brisbane and
Gold Coast areas in QLD,Australia. They were assigned to a frontal
stroke group (n= 14) or a non-frontal stroke group (n= 29) based
on neurologists’ reports and MRI/CT scan findings. Demographic
details for the three groups are reported in Table 1.
The three groups did not differ significantly in terms of gender
balance, χ2 (2, N = 83)= 0.95, p= 0.963, age, F (2, 80)= 0.94,
p= 0.394, nor years of education, F (2, 80)= 0.04, p= 0.96. Time
since stroke was significantly longer for the frontal stroke group
Table 1 | Demographic details for participants in the unimpaired,
non-frontal stroke, and frontal stroke groups.
Variable Group
Unimpaired Non-frontal
stroke
Frontal
stroke
Age (years) M 68.28 64.79 64.29
SD 12.16 13.41 8.82
Education (years) M 11.75 11.76 11.50
SD 3.12 3.30 3.23
Gender Males 24 19 7
Females 16 10 7
Time since stroke
(years)
M – 6.05 10.08
SE – 0.89 1.28
MMSE M 28.80 27.03 26.14
SE 0.40 0.47 0.67
N=83.
Table 2 | Lesion location in the non-frontal and frontal stroke groups.
Stroke group
Non-frontal
n=29
Frontal
n=14
Hemisphere of damage Left 11 7
Right 16 4
Both 2 3
Regions of damage Temporal 8 5
Occipital 3 1
Sub-cortical 19 5
Parietal 6 7
Frontal 0 14
Entries are frequencies.
than for the non-frontal stroke group, t (41)= 2.59, p= 0.013.
To the extent that there is some recovery of function over time,
this longer time since stroke would advantage the frontal stroke
group over the non-frontal stroke group, thus providing a counter-
confound to predicted differences between this and the other
groups.
Table 2 summarizes lesion location as a function of stroke
group. There was no significant association between stroke
group and damage to left, right, or both hemispheres, χ2 (1,
N = 43)= 3.48, p= 0.09, damage to temporal lobes, χ2 (1,
N = 43)= 0.30, p= 0.73, occipital lobes, χ2 (1, N = 43)= 0.12,
p= 0.74, sub-cortical regions,χ2 (1,N = 43)= 3.40,p= 0.10, nor
parietal regions, χ2 (1, N = 43)= 3.85, p= 0.08 (exact tests).
The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al.,
1975) was administered to all participants in the standard manner.
The test consists of items assessing orientation to time and place,
concentration, language, constructional ability, and immediate
and delayed recall. The score was the number of correct responses
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(max.= 30). Mean MMSE scores are shown in Table 1. Analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant effect of group,
F (2, 80)= 7.59, p= 0.001, partial η2= 0.159. Post hoc Scheffe
tests showed that the unimpaired group had significantly higher
MMSE scores than the non-frontal stroke group (p= 0.019) and
the frontal stroke group (p= 0.004). MMSE was therefore used as
a covariate in all analyses that compared the groups.
MEASURES AND PROCEDURES
Ethical approval for the research was granted by the Griffith
University Human Research Ethics Committee (GU Ref No:
APY/82/04/HREC). Participants were tested individually at their
residences by two female research assistants with postgraduate
training in psychology and experience working with brain-injured
individuals. The tests described below were administered as part of
a larger battery. Testing was spread over two to four sessions, each
1–2 h in duration. Breaks were offered between tasks. Instructions
were repeated or elaborated as required to ensure that participants
understood the task requirements.
Tower of London
The task was an expanded 15-item version of the 4-disk TOL task
of Shum et al. (2000, 2009). The apparatus consisted of four col-
ored disks and a base with three vertical poles that differed in height
and accommodated a maximum of two, three, or four disks. On all
problems the apparatus was presented with the disks in the same
initial configuration, which is shown in Figure 1A and Table 3.
The goal states for the 15 problems are also shown in Table 3 as
are the moves to solution, estimated search depth, goal ambiguity,
and relational complexity for each problem.
Participants were instructed to rearrange the disks into the tar-
get configuration (shown pictorially), and to do so in a specified
number of moves. Only one disk could be moved at a time. Scores
of three, two, or one were awarded for correct solutions on the
first-, second-, and third-attempts, respectively, and zero for no
solution after three attempts. All participants received the prob-
lems in the order shown in Table 3 in which the problems with
higher expected difficulty were concentrated later in the sequence.
A stopping rule was implemented such that if participants failed
to solve two consecutive problems after three attempts at each
problem, no further problems were presented. The maximum
score was 45 (based on 15 items). The mean number of TOL
problems presented was 13.53 (SD= 2.11, range 5–15). Planning
times were measured for the first attempt of each problem. Tim-
ing began at the commencement of each trial and ended when
the first disk was moved. Instances of rule breaking (e.g., placing
more than the allowed number of disks on a pole, moving two
disks at a time) were also recorded. Rule breaks were not imme-
diately corrected because doing so might have unduly influenced
participants’ subsequent attempts on the problem.
Latin square task
On each problem on the LST task, a 4× 4 matrix was presented
on the left side of the computer screen (Birney et al., 2006, 2012;
Perret et al., 2011; Andrews and Maurer, 2012). Colored geometric
objects filled some cells, while other cells were empty, as shown in
Figure 2. The participants’ task was to select one of four objects
to fill a target cell (indicated by “?”). The response options were
shown to the right of the matrix. The rule was that each of the
four objects could occur only once in each row and column of the
matrix. Consistent with the principles described previously, the
complexity estimates reflect the most complex step within each
problem.
For binary-relational problems, the most complex step required
consideration of information from a single row or column. For
example, the first step of the binary-relational problem shown in
Figure 2A, involves working out that the empty cell in column
2 must be filled with a green square. This can be accomplished
by considering the contents of a single column, column 2 in this
example. On the next step, the object to be placed in the target cell
can be identified by considering the contents of a single row, row 1
in this example. Row 1 now includes blue diamond, green square,
and red circle, so it is clear that the pink cross must be placed in
target cell. According to the analysis of Birney et al. (2006, 2012)
considering the contents of a single row or a single column is
binary-relational.
For ternary-relational problems, the most complex step
required integration of information from a row and column.
These two sources of variation must be integrated to determine
the cell content. For the problem in Figure 2B, the first step is
to identify the object to be placed in the cell at the intersec-
tion of column 3 and row 3 (blue square) by considering the
objects already present in row 3 and column 3. Once this object
is identified, the content of the target cell (pink cross) can be
determined by considering the contents of row 3. The first (most
complex) step is ternary-relational, whereas the second step is
binary-relational.
For quaternary-relational problems, the most complex step
required integration of information across multiple rows and
columns. For the problem in Figure 2C, the first step is to identify
the object to be placed in the cell at the intersection of column 1
and row 3 (light blue diamond) by considering the objects already
present in this row and column. This step is ternary-relational.
The next step requires consideration of the information in three
columns (1, 2, and 4) to determine that light blue diamond should
be placed in the target cell. According to the analysis provided by
Birney et al. (2006, 2012) the second step is quaternary-relational.
There were four problems at each complexity level. Partici-
pants worked through the problems as quickly as possible doing all
working in their heads. The score was number correct (max= 12).
Trail making test
In TMT Part A, numbers (1–25) were arranged randomly on a
page. Participants drew lines connecting the numbers in ascend-
ing order as quickly as possible (Reitan and Wolfson, 1995). In
TMT Part B, the stimuli were numbers (1–13) and letters (A–
L). Participants drew lines connecting the numbers and letters in
alternating order (1, A, 2, B, . . .). Part B required integration of
two sequences (one numerical and one alphabetic) into a single
alternating sequence. The two dependent measures corresponded
to the times taken to complete Part A and Part B.
RESULTS
DIFFICULTY OF TOL PROBLEMS
Item-based correlations were computed to examine the extent of
overlap among the four metrics and the extent to which each
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Table 3 | Initial statea, goal states, moves to solution, relational complexity, goal ambiguity, and search depth for the 15Tower of London
problems.
Peg 1 Peg 2 Peg 3 Metric
Initial state
Yellow Blue
White –b Black
Goal state Moves to solution Search depth Goal ambiguity Relational complexity
1 Yellow Black 2 0 Moderate Binary
White Blue –
2 Yellow 3 1 Low Ternary
White
Blue
– – Black
3 Yellow White 3 0 Moderate Binary
– Blue Black
4 Blue 4 0 Moderate Binary
White
Black Yellow –
5 Yellow 3 0 Moderate Ternary
White
– Blue Black
6 Yellow 5 0 High Ternary
Black Blue White
7 White Yellow 5 2 Moderate Ternary
Blue – Black
8 Blue 5 2 Low Quaternary
Yellow
White
– – Black
9 Blue Yellow 6 1 Moderate Ternary
Black White –
10 Black 6 1 High Quaternary
Yellow White Blue
11 Yellow 6 3 High Quaternary
White Black Blue
12 Yellow 7 1 Moderate Ternary
Black
Blue White –
13 Yellow 7 3 High Quaternary
White Black Blue
14 Blue 9 5 Moderate Quaternary
Yellow
– Black White
15 Blue 9 5 Moderate Quaternary
White
Yellow Black –
aThe initial state was the same in all problems.
bIndicates an empty peg.
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metric was associated with performance on the fifteen TOL prob-
lems. As shown in Table 4, moves to solution, search depth
and relational complexity were significantly and positively inter-
correlated, but the correlations with goal ambiguity did not reach
significance.
FIGURE 2 | Latin square problems at (A) binary-relational, (B)
ternary-relational, and (C) quaternary-relational levels of complexity.
Moves to solution, search depth and relational complexity were
significantly negatively correlated with solution accuracy on the
TOL problems. Solution accuracy was lower for problems that
required more moves, had greater search depth and higher rela-
tional complexity. Moves to solution, search depth and relational
complexity were significantly positively correlated with planning
times on problems correctly solved on the first attempt. Plan-
ning times were longer for problems that required more moves,
had greater search depth and higher relational complexity. Goal
ambiguity was not significantly associated with solution accuracy
or planning times, therefore it was not included in subsequent
regression analyses.
Item-based multiple regression analyses were conducted to
determine which of three metrics accounted for independent vari-
ance in solution accuracy and planning times. Given the small
sample size (N = 15) the findings should be interpreted with cau-
tion. In the first analysis, moves to solution, search depth and
relational complexity together accounted for 88% variance in
solution accuracy, F (3, 11)= 26.85, p< 0.001. Moves to solu-
tion (8.29%, p= 0.019) and search depth (6.6%, p= 0.032) each
accounted for unique variance. The remaining variance (73%) was
shared by the predictors. In the second analysis, moves to solu-
tion, search depth, and relational complexity together accounted
for 76.3% variance in planning times, F (3, 11)= 11.79, p= 0.001.
Search depth accounted for unique variance (10.96%, p= 0.046).
The remaining variance (65%) was shared by the predictors.
TOL4 SOLUTION ACCURACY IN STROKE GROUPS
Mini-mental state examination was included as a covariate in all
analyses examining group differences. The means reported for the
group based analyses have been adjusted for the covariate.
A preliminary analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was con-
ducted with group (unimpaired, non-frontal stroke, and frontal
stroke) as the between subjects variable, and MMSE as the covari-
ate. The dependent variable was the total score (max= 45) for
the 15 TOL4 problems. The analysis yielded a significant effect
of Group, F (2, 79)= 5.12, p= 0.008, partial η2= 0.115. Con-
trast analyses showed that the difference between unimpaired
group (M = 32.29; SE= 0.99) and the non-frontal stroke groups
(M = 30.72; SE= 1.13) was not significant (p= 0.31). However,
Table 4 | Item-based correlations among moves to solution, relational complexity, goal ambiguity, search depth and solution accuracy, and
planning times on the first attempt for correctly solvedTower of London problems (N =15).
Moves Search
depth
Goal
ambiguity
Relational
complexity
Solution
accuracy
Planning
times
Moves to solution
Search depth 0.83**
Goal ambiguity 0.28 0.05
Relational complexity 0.75** 0.76** 0.23
Solution accuracy −0.90** −0.89** −0.32 −0.71**
Planning times 0.81** 0.84** 0.27 0.61* −0.90**
Mean 5.40 1.60 1.13 3.20 2.04 22.59
SD 2.06 1.72 0.64 0.78 0.99 22.51
**p<0.01; *p<0.05.
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the frontal stroke group (M = 25.91; SE= 1.66) had significantly
lower scores than the non-frontal stroke group (p= 0.017) and
the unimpaired control group (p= 0.002). An analysis based on
the original ten TOL4 problems yielded the same pattern of group
differences.
SENSITIVITY OF THE DIFFICULTY METRICS TO STROKE DAMAGE
Four mixed ANCOVAs were conducted to examine group differ-
ences as a function of problem difficulty operationalized as moves,
goal ambiguity, search depth, and relational complexity.
For the first analysis, the problems were categorized according
to number of moves. The five low move problems required 2, 3,
or 4 moves to solution, the six moderate move problems required
5 or 6 moves, and the four high move problems required 7 or
9 moves. Solution accuracy scores were converted to percentages
and subjected to a mixed 3× 3 ANCOVA in which Moves (low,
moderate, and high) was a within-subject variable, Group was a
between groups variable, and MMSE was the covariate. Consis-
tent with the preceding ANCOVA and the correlations (Table 4),
there were significant effects of Group, F (2, 79)= 4.86, p= 0.01,
partial η2= 0.11, and of Moves, F (2, 158)= 4.49, p= 0.013, par-
tial η2= 0.054. Percentage solution scores were higher for low
move problems (M = 94.09; SE= 1.00) than for both the moder-
ate move problems (M = 70.67; SE= 2.38) (p= 0.007) and the
high move problems (M = 23.37; SE= 2.84) (p= 0.012). The
Group×Moves interaction, F (4, 158)= 1.37, p= 0.25 was not
significant. To facilitate comparison with other metrics, group dif-
ferences were examined at each level of moves. The adjusted means
are presented in Table 5.
For low move problems, there was a significant effect of group,
F (2, 79)= 7.78, p= 0.001, partial η2= 0.165. Solution accuracy
in the unimpaired group and non-frontal stroke did not differ
significantly (p= 0.84). Solution accuracy in the frontal stroke
group was significantly lower than the unimpaired (p< 0.001) and
non-frontal stroke group (p= 0.001). For the moderate moves
problems there were significant effects of the covariate, F (1,
79)= 4.33, p= 0.041, partial η2= 0.052 and of group, F (2,
79)= 3.90, p= 0.024, partial η2= 0.09. Solution accuracy in the
unimpaired group and non-frontal stroke did not differ signifi-
cantly (p= 0.76). Solution accuracy in the frontal stroke group
was significantly lower than the unimpaired (p= 0.009) and non-
frontal stroke group (p= 0.016). For the high moves problems
Table 5 | Solution accuracy forTOL problems with low, moderate, and
high moves by group.
Group Moves
Low Moderate High
Unimpaired M 97.60 76.95 31.63
SE 1.36 3.23 3.85
Non-frontal stroke M 97.16 75.41 21.42
SE 1.55 3.68 4.39
Frontal stroke M 87.52 59.64 17.07
SE 2.72 5.41 6.45
there was no significant effect of group, F (2, 79)= 2.31, p= 0.11,
partial η2= 0.055.
A similar approach was used to examine goal ambiguity. There
were two problems with low goal ambiguity, nine with moderate
goal ambiguity, and four with high goal ambiguity. There were
significant effects of Group, F (2, 79)= 5.40, p= 0.006, partial
η2= 0.12, and Goal Ambiguity, F (2, 158)= 4.32, p= 0.015, par-
tialη2= 0.052. Percentage solution scores were significantly higher
for low goal ambiguity (M = 89.28; SE = 2.05) than high ambigu-
ity (M = 53.82; SE = 2.97) problems, F (1, 79)= 6.13, p= 0.015,
η2= 0.072, and marginally higher than for problems with the
moderate goal ambiguity (M = 66.01; SE= 1.44),F (1, 79)= 3.60,
p= 0.061, η2= 0.044. The Group×Goal Ambiguity interaction,
F (4, 158)< 1, p= 0.55, did not approach significance. Group dif-
ferences for problems with low, moderate, and high goal ambiguity
were examined. The adjusted means are presented in Table 6.
For problems with low goal ambiguity, there was a significant
effect of group, F (2, 79)= 5.44, p= 0.006, partial η2= 0.121.
Solution accuracy in the unimpaired group and non-frontal stroke
did not differ significantly (p= 0.68). Solution accuracy in the
frontal stroke group was significantly lower than the unimpaired
(p= 0.002) and non-frontal stroke group (p= 0.005). For prob-
lems with moderate goal ambiguity there was a significant effect of
group,F (2, 79)= 4.92,p= 0.01, partialη2= 0.111. Solution accu-
racy in the unimpaired group and non-frontal stroke did not differ
significantly (p= 0.56). Solution accuracy in the frontal stroke
group was significantly lower than the unimpaired (p= 0.003) and
non-frontal stroke group (p= 0.01). For problems with high goal
ambiguity there was no significant effect of group,F (2, 79)= 2.40,
p= 0.097, partial η2= 0.057.
Search depth was examined in the same way. The five low
search depth problems had a depth of zero, the six medium
depth problems had depths of 1 or 2, and the four high search
depth problems had depths of 3 or 5. There were significant
effects of Group, F (2, 79)= 5.36, p= 0.007, partial η2= 0.12,
and Search Depth, F (2, 158)= 4.55, p= 0.012, partial η2= 0.054.
Percentage solution scores were significantly higher for low depth
(M = 92.55; SE= 1.14) than high depth (M = 16.33; SE= 2.38)
problems, F (1, 79)= 8.30, p= 0.005, η2= 0.095. Solution accu-
racy for the moderate depth (M = 75.74; SE= 2.43) problems
did not differ significantly from low (p= 0.11) or high depth
problems (p= 0.15). The Group× Search Depth interaction, F
Table 6 | Solution accuracy forTOL4 problems with low, medium, and
high goal ambiguity by group.
Group Goal ambiguity
Low Medium High
Unimpaired M 95.78 70.60 62.31
SE 2.78 1.95 4.02
Non-frontal stroke M 93.99 68.84 54.10
SE 3.17 2.23 4.58
Frontal stroke M 78.09 58.59 45.05
SE 4.66 3.27 6.73
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 1032 | 8
Andrews et al. Impaired planning following stroke
Table 7 | Solution accuracy forTOL4 problems with low, moderate,
and high search depth by group.
Group Search depth
Low Medium High
Unimpaired M 96.23 80.69 25.60
SE 1.54 3.29 3.22
Non-frontal stroke M 97.63 79.55 13.49
SE 1.76 3.75 3.67
Frontal stroke M 83.79 66.98 9.90
SE 2.59 5.50 5.39
(4, 158)= 2.27, p= 0.065, partial η2= 0.054, approached signif-
icance. Group differences were examined at each level of search
depth. The adjusted means are shown in Table 7.
For low depth problems, there were significant effects of the
covariate (MMSE), F (1, 79)= 4.47, p< 0.038, η2= 0.053, and
Group, F (2, 79)= 10.90, p< 0.001, η2= 0.216. Solution accu-
racy in the unimpaired and non-frontal stroke groups did not
differ significantly (p= 0.56). Solution accuracy in the frontal
stroke group was significantly lower than in the non-frontal stroke
group (p< 0.001) and the unimpaired group (p< 0.001). For
the moderate depth problems, solution accuracy in the unim-
paired, non-frontal, and frontal stroke groups did not differ sig-
nificantly, F (2, 79)= 2.37, p= 0.10, η2= 0.057. For high depth
problems, there was a significant effect of Group, F (2, 79)= 4.19,
p= 0.019, η2= 0.096. Solution accuracy in the unimpaired group
was significantly higher than in the non-frontal stroke group
(p= 0.018) and significantly higher than in the frontal stroke
group (p= 0.018) but the two stroke groups did not differ
significantly (p= 0.577).
Relational complexity was examined in the same way. There
were three, six, and six problems, respectively at the binary,
ternary, and quaternary-relational levels of complexity. The analy-
sis yielded significant effects of Group, F (2, 79)= 5.65, p= 0.005,
partial η2= 0.125 and Complexity, F (2, 158)= 5.23, p= 0.006,
η2= 0.062. Solution accuracy was significantly higher for
binary- (M = 96.08; SE= 0.86) than ternary-relational problems
(M = 78.63; SE= 2.05), F (1, 79)= 4.07, p= 0.047, η2= 0.049,
and for binary- than quaternary-relational problems (M = 37.99;
SE= 2.35), F (1, 79)= 8.85, p= 0.004, η2= 0.101. There was also
a significant Group×Complexity interaction, F (4, 158)= 2.43,
p= 0.05, η2= 0.058. Group differences were examined at each
complexity level. The adjusted means are shown in Table 8.
For binary-relational problems, there were significant effects
of the covariate (MMSE), F (1, 79)= 4.57, p< 0.036, η2= 0.055,
and Group, F (2, 79)= 7.30, p= 0.001, η2= 0.156. Solution accu-
racy in the unimpaired and the non-frontal stroke groups did
not differ significantly (p= 0.53). Solution accuracy was signif-
icantly lower in the frontal stroke group than the non-frontal
stroke group (p< 0.001) and the unimpaired group (p= 0.002).
For the ternary-relational problems, there was a significant effect
of Group, F (2, 79)= 4.47, p= 0.015, η2= 0.102. Solution accu-
racy in the unimpaired and the non-frontal stroke groups did not
Table 8 | Solution accuracy for binary-, ternary-, and
quaternary-relationalTOL4 problems by group.
Relational complexity
Binary Ternary Quaternary
Unimpaired M 98.18 83.55 46.73
SE 1.16 2.78 3.18
Non-frontal stroke M 99.32 83.90 37.09
SE 1.32 3.17 3.63
Frontal stroke M 90.75 68.43 30.14
SE 1.94 4.66 5.32
differ significantly (p= 0.94). Solution accuracy was significantly
lower in the frontal stroke group than the non-frontal stroke
group (p= 0.006) and the unimpaired group (p= 0.008). For
quaternary-relational problems, there was a significant effect of
Group, F (2, 79)= 3.85, p= 0.025, partial η2= 0.089. Solution
accuracy was marginally higher in the unimpaired group than the
non-frontal stroke group (p= 0.054) and significantly higher than
in the frontal stroke group (p= 0.011). The two stroke groups did
not differ significantly (p= 0.274).
In summary, the foregoing analyses show that patterns of group
differences on problems at low, intermediate, and high difficulty
levels differ according to how problem difficulty is measured. On
the easiest problems, the frontal stroke group performed more
poorly than the unimpaired group irrespective of whether problem
difficulty was expressed in terms of moves to solution, goal ambi-
guity, search depth, or relational complexity. The frontal stroke
group also performed more poorly than the non-frontal stroke
group on the easiest problems.
On problems with an intermediate level of difficulty, the frontal
stroke group performed more poorly than the unimpaired group
and the non-frontal stroke group when problem difficulty was
expressed in terms of moves to solution, goal ambiguity, and rela-
tional complexity, but not when difficulty was expressed in terms
of search depth. No significant group differences were observed
on moderate depth problems.
On problems at the highest level of difficulty, the frontal stroke
group performed more poorly than the unimpaired group when
problem difficulty was expressed in terms of search depth and
relational complexity. The frontal and non-frontal stroke groups
performed poorly on high search depth and quaternary-relational
problems and there were no significant differences between these
two groups. No significant differences were observed between
unimpaired, non-frontal stroke, and frontal stroke groups on high
move problems and problems with high goal ambiguity.
Thus the pattern of significance for the group effects shows that
TOL4 problems at all three levels of the domain-general relational
complexity metric were sensitive to frontal lobe damage whereas
TOL4 problems at two levels of the task-specific metrics (moves,
goal ambiguity, and search depth) were sensitive to frontal lobe
damage. Inspection of the effect sizes reported above indicates a
similar pattern in that effect sizes were <0.058 for the moderate
search depth, high moves, high goal ambiguity problems for which
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the group effect was not significant, whereas effects sizes exceeded
0.088 in all other conditions.
PLANNING TIMES FOR TOL PROBLEMS SOLVED ON FIRST ATTEMPT
Participants with no first attempt solutions for any problems at a
particular difficulty level were excluded from these analyses. This
meant that the overall sample sizes were reduced to 39 (n= 22
unimpaired; n= 12 non-frontal stroke; n= 5 frontal stroke) for
the analysis examining moves to solution, to 72 (n= 35 unim-
paired; n= 27 non-frontal stroke; n= 10 frontal stroke) for the
analysis examining goal ambiguity, to 28 (n= 22 unimpaired;
n= 4 non-frontal stroke; n= 2 frontal stroke) for the analysis
examining search depth and to 75 (n= 38 unimpaired; n= 27
non-frontal stroke; n= 10 frontal stroke) for the analysis examin-
ing relational complexity. The losses were due mainly to the more
difficult problems, where participants were more likely to require
multiple attempts.
Four separate ANOVAs were conducted with moves, goal ambi-
guity, search depth, or relational complexity as the within-subject
factor. There was a significant effect of Moves, F (2, 76)= 20.72,
p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.353. Planning times (seconds) were sig-
nificantly shorter for low move problems (M = 8.22; SE= 0.52)
than for moderate move problems (M = 15.27; SE= 1.56), F (1,
38)= 19.87,p< 0.001, partialη2= 0.343, which were significantly
shorter than for high move problems (M = 30.71; SE= 4.71),F (1,
38)= 17.17, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.311.
There was a significant effect of Goal Ambiguity, F (2,
142)= 21.36, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.231. Planning times (sec-
onds) for problems with low (M = 10.73; SE= 1.06) and moderate
goal ambiguity (M = 11.93; SE= 0.76) did not differ significantly,
F (1, 71)= 1.18, p= 0.282. Planning tomes for problems with
low ambiguity were significantly shorter than for problems with
high goal ambiguity (M = 19.69; SE= 1.91), F (1, 71)= 28.897,
p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.289.
There was a significant effect of Search Depth,F (2, 54)= 23.48,
p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.465. Planning times were significantly
shorter for low depth problems (M = 7.81; SE= 0.60) than
for medium depth problems (M = 13.90; SE= 1.30), F (1,
27)= 22.68,p< 0.001, partialη2= 0.467, which were significantly
shorter than for high depth problems (M = 34.76; SE= 5.43), F
(1, 27)= 20.87, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.436.
There was a significant effect of Relational Complexity, F (2,
148)= 14.52, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.164. Planning times were
significantly shorter for binary-relational problems (M = 8.59;
SE= 0.52) than for ternary-relational problems (M = 11.18;
SE= 0.73), F (1, 74)= 13.80, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.157, which
were significantly shorter than for quaternary-relational prob-
lems (M = 19.19; SE= 2.08), F (1, 74)= 11.72, p< 0.001, partial
η2= 0.137.
These findings are generally consistent with the item-based cor-
relations. However, when Group was included as an independent
variable along with MMSE as the covariate, the ANCOVAs yielded
no significant effects of Group, MMSE, Moves, Goal Ambiguity,
Depth or Relational Complexity, and no significant interactions.
These null results likely reflect inclusion of the covariate, the
small and unequal sizes of the unimpaired, non-frontal stroke
and frontal stroke groups, and high within-group variability in
planning times.
TOL RULE BREAKS
Analysis of covariance was applied to the number of rule breaks.
The analysis yielded a significant effect of Group, F (2, 79)= 5.03,
p= 0.009, partial η2= 0.113. Contrast analyses showed that the
difference between the unimpaired group (M = 0.35; SE= 0.21)
and the non-frontal stroke group (M = 0.38; SE= 0.23) was
not significant (p= 0.938). The frontal stroke group (M = 1.56;
SE= 0.34) committed significantly more rule breaks than the non-
frontal stroke group (p= 0.005), however it should be noted that
the absolute number of rule breaks was quite low (M = 0.77;
SE= 0.15; N = 83).
PREDICTING TOL SOLUTION ACCURACY
Table 9 shows the zero-order correlations among the TOL4,
LST scores (max= 12) and TMT-Parts A and B. Stroke status
(0= unimpaired; 1= stroke) and frontal location (0= no frontal
injury; 1= frontal injury) were dummy variables that together
capture the grouping variable used in the ANCOVAs. The TOL4
measure is the average of the binary-, ternary-, and quaternary-
relational percentages scores. The results are very similar when
the total score (max 45) is used. The negative correlations occur
because TMT-A and TMT-B are measures of response times rather
than accuracy.
Table 9 | Zero-order correlations (N =83).
TOL4 (%) Stroke status Frontal MMSE TMT-A TMT-B LST
Stroke status −0.31**
Frontal location −0.40*** 0.43***
MMSE 0.33** −0.38*** −0.27**
TMT-A (times) −0.51*** 0.34** 0.35** −0.51***
TMT-B (times) −0.62*** 0.38*** 0.44*** −0.55*** 0.85***
Latin square 0.51*** −0.32** −0.33** 0.29** −0.42*** −0.50***
Mean 73.00 0.52 0.17 27.74 43.94 146.01 5.78
SD 13.10 0.50 0.38 2.70 27.92 157.06 3.31
TOL, Tower of London; TMT-A, trail making test part A completion times; TMT-B, trail making test part B completion times; LST, Latin square task.
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Table 10 | Multiple regression analyses predictingTOL4 solution accuracy.
Predictors B SE (B) ß Part p
Step 1 Stroke status −2.72 3.02 −0.10 −0.09 0.372
Frontal/non-frontal −10.33 3.87 −0.30 −0.27 0.009
MMSE 1.01 0.53 0.21 0.19 0.060
Multiple R2=0.218, F (3, 79)=7.35, p <0.001
Step 2 Stroke status −1.47 2.69 −0.06 −0.05 0.586
Frontal/non-frontal −4.90 3.60 −0.14 −0.12 0.177
MMSE −0.16 0.53 −0.03 −0.03 0.765
TMT-A 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.753
TMT-B −0.05 0.02 −0.60 −0.29 0.001
Multiple R2=0.405 F (5, 77)=10.47, p <0.001
Step 3 Stroke status −0.67 2.62 −0.03 −0.02 0.800
Frontal/non-frontal −4.04 3.50 −0.12 −0.10 0.252
MMSE −0.15 0.51 −0.03 −0.03 0.771
TMT-A 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.770
TMT-B −0.04 0.02 −0.49 −0.23 0.008
LST 0.98 0.40 0.25 0.21 0.016
Multiple R2=0.449, F (6, 76)=10.32, p <0.001
A multiple regression analysis with TOL4 as the criterion vari-
able was conducted. On step 1, the dummy variables stroke status
and frontal-non-frontal were entered, along with MMSE. These
variables together accounted for significant variance in TOL4
performance. On step 2, TMT-A and TMT-B accounted for an
additional 18.6% variance (p< 0.001). On step 3, LST accounted
for a further 4.41% variance (p= 0.016). The unique contribu-
tion of TMT-B was reduced from 8.47% at step 2 to 5.38% at
step 3, indicating that TMT-B and LST accounted for shared
variance in TOL performance. This analysis is summarized in
Table 10.
DISCUSSION
Our research examined planning assessed using a 4-disk version
of the TOL (Shum et al., 2009) following stroke. The overall solu-
tion scores provided evidence of impairment but only in those
whose strokes resulted in damage to frontal regions of the brain.
The overall solution scores, which collapse over problem difficulty,
provided no evidence of planning impairments following stroke
affecting non-frontal brain regions. These findings are consistent
with previous research using the TOL4 (Shum et al., 2009).
We also investigated the extent to which relational complexity
theory (Halford et al., 1998), which has been shown to account for
performance in many cognitive domains also applies to planning
on the TOL4. According to relational complexity theory, integrat-
ing the relations between current states, intermediate states, and
goal states is a key process in planning. Three aspects of the findings
are consistent with relational complexity theory.
First, the observed difficulty of the TOL4 problems increased
with the estimated relational complexity of the problems. This
was also the case for other complexity metrics. The item-based
correlations demonstrate that moves to solution, search depth,
and relational complexity are not independent. In the regression
analyses, search depth and moves to solution emerged as predictors
of solution accuracy and search depth also predicted planning
times on problems correctly solved on the first attempt, but in
both cases the majority of the variance was shared. Search depth
and moves to solution are intrinsic to the TOL4 task but unlike
relational complexity they are not applicable across domains.
Search depth quantifies difficulty up to the first goal move.
Köstering et al. (2014) showed that search depth is well suited
to TOL3 problems. Our findings show that it also captures the
difficulty of TOL4 problems that require up to nine moves to
solution. The search depth metric and the relational complexity
metric both focus on the relations and interdependencies within a
sequence of moves and this might underpin the observed positive
correlation.
That the number of moves metric predicted solution accu-
racy is consistent with many previous findings (e.g., Newman
et al., 2003; Kaller et al., 2012). The finding is unsurprising in
one sense because problems that require more moves to solu-
tion also provide more opportunities for errors. Nevertheless, the
fact that number of moves was strongly correlated with search
depth and relational complexity, which are less vulnerable to this
criticism indicates its usefulness as a difficulty metric. One fea-
ture of the moves metric that might contribute to its prediction
of performance is its scaling. For problems used in the current
study, moves ranged from 2 to 9 with most intermediate values
represented. The values of search depth (0, 1, 2, 3, 5), goal ambigu-
ity (low, moderate, and high), and relational complexity (binary-,
ternary-, and quaternary-relational) were more limited in range.
These scaling differences between the metrics should be consid-
ered when interpreting the item-based correlations and regression
analyses.
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It is also likely that metrics that are specific to a task, as moves
to solution and search depth are to TOL, will tend to account for
more variance in that task. However, because such metrics cannot
be applied to other tasks, they cannot be used to compare diffi-
culty of TOL problems with other tasks. The relational complexity
approach does allow this. For example, number of moves on the
TOL4 task does not have the same meaning as number of moves
(steps to solution) on the LST, whereas the relational complexity
values are arguably comparable.
The second finding consistent with relational complexity the-
ory is that as in previous studies (Unterrainer and Owen, 2006;
Shum et al., 2009) impaired performance was most evident in
people with frontal lobe damage. Relational processing is known
to rely on the integrity of the frontal lobes (e.g., Waltz et al., 1999,
2004; Kroger et al., 2002; Crone et al., 2009; Andrews et al., 2013),
so this finding is consistent with the view that TOL4 problems
involve relational processing.
The frontal stroke group was impaired relative to unimpaired
controls on TOL4 problems at all three levels of relational com-
plexity. This was not the case when difficulty was expressed in
terms of moves, goal ambiguity, and search depth. TOL4 problems
with low and moderate numbers of moves, low and moderate goal
ambiguity, and low and high search depth were sensitive to frontal
lobe damage. Thus relational complexity was more sensitive to
frontal lobe damage than the other metrics were.
Relative to the non-frontal stroke group, the frontal stroke
group was impaired on low move and moderate move problems,
problems with low and moderate goal ambiguity, and problems
with low search depth and binary- and ternary-relational prob-
lems. Thus none of the metrics was successful in distinguishing
patients with frontal versus non-frontal damage at all three levels
of difficulty. The significant group effects that were observed on the
most difficult quaternary-relational and high search depth prob-
lems reflected differences between unimpaired and stroke groups
rather than between non-frontal and frontal stroke groups. That
this impairment in the non-frontal group was detected only on
a subset of the problems illustrates one benefit of analyzing the
cognitive demands involved in planning on the TOL4.
Given the demonstrated limit for young adults (Halford et al.,
2005), the poor performance of the two stroke groups on the
quaternary-relational problems is not surprising. Recent brain
imaging of individuals without brain damage showed that limits in
relational processing during a deductive reasoning task were mani-
fested in the brain as complexity-dependent modulations of large-
scale networks that involved both frontal and non-frontal (e.g.,
parietal, occipital) regions (Cocchi et al., 2014). If these regions
are damaged in individuals in the non-frontal stroke group, their
performance on the quaternary-relational TOL4 problems would
be adversely affected relative to the unimpaired group. Four of the
six quaternary-relational problems were classified as high search
depth, and this overlap would explain the similar pattern observed
on the high search depth and quaternary-relational problems.
A third finding is consistent with relational complexity theory.
As noted, the relational complexity approach has been applied
to tasks in many different content domains and cross-domain
correspondences in performance have been demonstrated in chil-
dren (Andrews and Halford, 2002; Halford et al., 2002a,b; Bunch
and Andrews, 2012), and adults (Andrews et al., 2006, 2013), sug-
gesting that relational processing is a domain-general capacity. As
predicted, relational processing in the LST accounted for variance
in TOL4 performance after controlling for stroke status and loca-
tion, MMSE and completion times on parts A and B of the TMT.
The TOL4 and the LST differ substantially in terms of their stim-
uli and procedural requirements. Therefore the shared variance
is unlikely to reflect common surface features of the tasks. We
interpret the variance shared by TOL4 and LST as evidence that
a common capacity for complex relational processing underpins
both tasks.
Completion times for the TMT also accounted for vari-
ance in TOL4, but this was due mainly to part B rather
than part A. Whereas TMT-A and TMT-B both require non-
executive processes involved in visual scanning and speeded motor
responses, TMT-B also requires the executive processes involved
in set-shifting, maintaining two response sets in working memory,
and inhibitory control (Müller et al., 2014). The unique contribu-
tion of TMT-B on step 2 of the regression analysis is consistent
with the involvement of executive processes in TOL4.
As well as accounting for independent variance in TOL4, TMT-
B, and LST also accounted for shared variance in TOL4. This
suggests that all three tasks have some common processes. We
argued previously that relational processing underpins both TOL4
and LST. TMT-B can also be construed in this way. It requires
integration of two well-known sequences, one numerical and the
other alphabetic. Each sequence incorporates a succession rela-
tion, in that one element is succeeded by the next element, for
example, succeeded by(3, 4) or succeeded by(D, E). Succession is
a binary relation because it cannot be defined on fewer than two
entities. TMT-B involves integrating the numerical and alphabetic
sequences such that the categories (numbers, letters) alternate,
for example, alternating (3, D, 4). Alternation is ternary-relational
because it cannot be defined on fewer than three entities. Thus we
propose that the variance shared by the three tasks reflects ternary-
relational processing. Some LST and TOL4 problems require
quaternary-relational processing, so the unique contribution of
LST might reflect this higher complexity.
The research contributes to our understanding of the processes
involved in TOL4. It adds to the studies cited previously, which
demonstrate that relational processing underpins performance on
a wide range of cognitive tasks. Given the ubiquitous nature of
relational processing, and the demonstrated effects of relational
complexity on performance, relational complexity theory provides
a parsimonious approach to conceptualizing human cognition.
The research also has practical implications. To the extent that
planning on tower tasks can be construed as relational processing,
interventions designed to improve relational processing through
for example, structural alignment training (Son et al., 2011; Hribar
et al., 2012), use of relational language (Gentner et al., 2011),
and techniques to improve access to relational components (e.g.,
Andrews et al., 2012) might also have beneficial effects on plan-
ning. Thus the findings have the potential to inform cognitive
rehabilitation of planning deficits following brain injury due to
stroke and other factors. Impairments in planning have adverse
implications for independent living (Jefferson et al., 2006). For
example, without the ability to plan, a person might have problems
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 1032 | 12
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in achieving independent activities of daily living or their voca-
tional goals. Thus effective interventions would imply considerable
benefits for individuals as well as for society more broadly.
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